

Generic Double-Authentication Preventing Signatures and a Post-Quantum Instantiation

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¹ work done while at Graz University of Technology



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Introduction

Digital Signatures




 ← Sign(🔑, )

Verify(⚙️, ) $\stackrel{?}{=} 1$ ✓

Applications

- Signing transactions in cryptocurrencies
- Certificate and software signing
- And many more

Double-Authentication Preventing Signatures [PS14]



- Same context (address), different content
- » Extract secret key
- Extraction from **honest** or **malicious** keys

Applications

- Deterring certificate subversion
- Double-spending prevention in offline payment channels
- Non-equivocation contracts


Existing DAPS

Approach	Address space	Extraction	Setting	Generic
[PS14]	exponential	DSE	factoring	×
[RKS15]	exponential	DSE	DLOG	×
[BPS17]	exponential	DSE	factoring	×
[BKN17]	exponential	DSE	SIS+LWE	×
[DRS18]	small	wDSE*	DLOG	✓
[Poe18]	small	DSE	DLOG	×


Can we build **efficient** DAPS without address space limitation from existing signature schemes in a **black-box** way?

DAPS without Structured Hardness Assumptions


Shamir Secret Sharing



Shamir Secret Sharing




Shamir Secret Sharing



- One point reveals nothing about sk_x

Shamir Secret Sharing



- Two points allow to recover sk_Σ

The [DRS18] Approach

- DLOG-based signature scheme Σ

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Sharing polynomial is address dependent
- » Extraction of Σ key

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The [DRS18] Approach

- DLOG-based signature scheme Σ
- + Extend signature with secret share of private key
 - Sharing polynomial is address dependent
- » Extraction of Σ key
- + Add consistency proof of share
 - » Store encrypted coefficients in public key
 - » **Polynomially sized** address space

Resolving the Address Space Limitation

- Derive coefficients of sharing polynomial using PRF \mathcal{F}

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- » Fixed-value key-binding PRF [CMR98, Fis99]

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- » Signature-of-knowledge style signature

Resolving the Address Space Limitation

- Derive coefficients of sharing polynomial using PRF \mathcal{F}
- “Commit” to the PRF secret key
- » Fixed-value key-binding PRF [CMR98, Fis99]
- Signatures: secret share and consistency proof
- » Signature-of-knowledge style signature
- + Only requirement: Σ public key image of one-way function

Construction



sk_{Σ}



pk_{Σ}

Construction



sk_{Σ}

$sk_{\mathcal{F}}$




pk_{Σ}

β

c

Construction



Construction

Q_k

sk_Σ

$sk_{\mathcal{F}}$

\star

pk_Σ

β


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
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Construction




secret sharing of sk_{Σ}

Construction




consistency proof of Σ keys

Construction




consistency proof of PRF commitment

Construction



consistency proof of sharing polynomial computation

Construction



consistency proof of secret sharing

Generic approach:

- Σ with OWF relation between secret and public key
- + Verifiable Shamir secret sharing of Σ secret key
- + Sharing polynomial determined by address

$$f_a(x) = \mathcal{F}(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{F}}, a) \cdot x + \text{sk}_{\Sigma}$$

Generic approach:

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$$f_a(x) = \mathcal{F}(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{F}}, a) \cdot x + \text{sk}_{\Sigma}$$

- Zero-knowledge proof of consistency

Security (informal)

- **Unforgeability** from simulation-sound extractability, PRF and OWF properties
- **Extraction** from fixed-value-key-binding of PRF

Wrap Up (cont.)

Security (informal)

- **Unforgeability** from simulation-sound extractability, PRF and OWF properties
- **Extraction** from fixed-value-key-binding of PRF

Extension

- ✦ Extendable to **N -authentication preventing signatures**
- » Use degree $N - 1$ sharing polynomial

Instantiation

From **Picnic**:

- + OWF built from block cipher LowMC
- » Use LowMC also for PRF
- » Estimated signature size: 408 KB

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- Multiple evaluations of hash functions for consistency proof

Instantiation

From **Picnic**:

- + OWF built from block cipher LowMC
- » Use LowMC also for PRF
- » Estimated signature size: 408 KB

From **SPHINCS**:

- Secret-key-to-public-key relation more expensive
- Multiple evaluations of hash functions for consistency proof

From **structured hardness assumptions**:

- + Fulfill secret-key-to-public-key relation requirement
- ? Suitable proof system
- » Recent progress [AGM18]

Extending Any Signature Scheme

Signature scheme Σ
 $\text{Sign}(\text{🔑} - \Sigma, \dots)$ $\text{Verify}(\text{⚙️} - \Sigma, \dots)$


Signature scheme Σ


$\text{Sign}(k_{\Sigma} - \Sigma, \dots)$ $\text{Verify}(c_{\Sigma} - \Sigma, \dots)$

DAPS scheme D

$\text{Sign}(k_D - D, \dots)$ $\text{Verify}(c_D - D, \dots)$

Black-box Extension





Black-box Extension (cont.)

- Extend any signature scheme to DAPS
- + From any other DAPS
- » DAPS from standard signatures like EdDSA, ECDSA

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Security (informal)

- **Unforgeability** from unforgeability of signature scheme
- **Extraction** from extraction of DAPS

Conclusion

DAPS Constructions

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[BPS17]	exponential	DSE	factoring	×
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[DRS18]	small	wDSE*	DLOG	✓
[Poe18]	small	DSE	DLOG	×
Constr. 1	exponential	wDSE	symmetric	✓
Constr. 2	exponential	DSE	any	✓

Contribution

- ✓ Generic constructions of DAPS
- ✓ Construction 1: DAPS from symmetric-key primitives
- ✓ Construction 2: Extension of any signature scheme to DAPS

Questions?

Full version: <https://ia.cr/2018/790>



Supported by: **prisma cloud**

References i

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Penalize Double-Spending




customer




merchants

Penalize Double-Spending


create offline payment channel




Penalize Double-Spending



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